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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
REID V. STATE: THE USE OF A TASER IN DART MODE
SUBJECTS AN INDIVIDUAL TO THE CUSTODY AND
CONTROL OF POLICE, THUS RAISING AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP TO A DE FACTO ARREST
REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE; WITHOUT PROBABLE
CAUSE, STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER
ADE FACTO ARREST ARE INADMISSIBLE.
By: Megan K. Green

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the use of a taser in dart
mode converted a Terry stop into a de facto arrest, as once the dart
penetrated the skin, the individual was under the custody and control of
the officer. Reid v. State, 428 Md. 289, 51 A.3d 597 (2012). The court
further held that neither the public safety exception to Miranda nor the
inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the seized gun or statements
made by the defendant. Because all evidence flowed from an illegal
arrest where probable cause was required, yet only articulable suspicion
was present, such evidence was inadmissible. Id. at 309,51 A.3d at 609.
Law enforcement officers received a tip from an informant who
notified them that a tall, black male was armed and selling drugs at a
public parking lot in Baltimore City. Officers responded and observed an
individual, later identified as David Reid ("Reid"), who met the
description provided by the informant. As the uniformed officers
approached, Reid engaged in a maneuver known as "blading," where an
armed individual turns away from the police to check and conceal the
waistband area where a gun would be located. As officers neared Reid,
he fled. Officers called out for Reid to stop, and when he failed to do so,
a detective shot two metal darts from his taser at Reid, which penetrated
his skin. Once apprehended, the detective asked Reid if he had anything
illegal on him, and Reid responded that he had a gun in his pocket. Law
enforcement officers searched Reid and seized a gun from his person.
Prior to trial, Reid moved to suppress statements made to police
regarding the gun and the gun itself. The Circuit Court for Baltimore
City denied the motion, finding that the law enforcement officers had
effectuated a proper Terry stop. The circuit court noted that law
enforcement officers may use reasonable force to effectuate a Terry stop,
and the use of the taser in dart mode was an appropriate quantum of force
given the circumstances. Ultimately, Reid was convicted of wearing,
carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally, and of being in possession
of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying offense. Reid appealed
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to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on its own initiative.
Recognizing this as a case of first impression, and in light of the
development of new technology, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
analyzed the Fourth Amendment in a new context. Reid, 428 Md. at 291,
51 A.3d at 591. In the landmark case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
held that a law enforcement officer may stop an individual if the officer
has an articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and may
further frisk the individual for weapons if the officer has an articulable
suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous. Id. at 297, 51 A.3d
at 602 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). However, if a Terry stop
is deemed to have risen to the level of a de Jacto arrest, probable cause
must have existed for the arrest to be valid. Reid, 428 Md. at 305, 51
A.3d at 607.
The court first addressed whether the use of a taser in dart mode is
analogous to a "hard take down," which had been previously deemed a
reasonable level of force in effectuating a Terry stop. Reid, 428 Md. at
297, 51 A.3d at 602. The Supreme Court has expressly held that
threatening a suspect with force is permissible during a Terry stop if the
officer believes the suspect to be armed and dangerous. !d. at 299, 51
A.3d at 603 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)). In
fact, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that drawing weapons is
reasonable during a Terry stop when the suspect is believed to be armed.
Reid, 428 Md. at 298,51 A.3d at 602 (citing In re David S., 367 Md. 523,
789 A.2d 607 (2002)). However, the court found the instant case
distinguishable, considering the difference in modalities of force, and
shifted its focus toward the point in which Reid's detention escalated from
a Terry stop to a de Jacto arrest. Reid, 428 Md. at 302, 51 A.3d at 605.
The court explained that a formal arrest occurs when a law
enforcement officer informs a suspect that he or she is under arrest. Reid,
428 Md. at 299-300,51 A.3d at 603. In contrast, a deJacto arrest occurs
when the circumstances surrounding the detention are such that a
reasonable person would not feel free to end the encounter. Id. Relying
on case law, the court analyzed the circumstances that elevate a Terry
stop to a de facto arrest. Id. at 302, 51 A.3d at 604.
In Bailey v. State, law enforcement officers detected a strong scent of
marijuana, immediately grabbed the suspect, put his hands over his head,
and searched him. Reid, 428 Md. at 300, 51 A.3d at 604 (citing Bailey v.
State, 412 Md. 349, 987 A.2d 72 (2010)). The court held that because
law enforcement officers acted with actual authority and physically
seized the suspect, the level of intrusion raised the stop to a de Jacto
arrest. Id. at 300-01, 51 A.3d at 604.
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The court then applied its understanding of a de Jacto arrest to the
circumstances surrounding Reid's detention. Reid, 428 Md. at 305, 51
A.3d at 606. Because a medical technician was needed to remove the
darts from Reid's skin, the court determined that he was subjected to the
custody and control of the police and under a de Jacto arrest as soon as
the darts penetrated his skin. Id. at 302,51 A.3d at 604-05. Based on the
circumstances, a reasonable person in Reid's position would not have felt
free to end the encounter. Id. at 305, 51 A.3d at 606. Furthermore, the
need for medical assistance extended the stop to an indefinite duration
and was therefore distinguishable from a hard take down. Id. at 302, 51
A.3d at 605.
Ultimately, because Reid was under the custody and control of
officers, the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that he was
subjected to a de Jacto arrest, which required probable cause. Reid, 428
Md. at 305, 51 A.3d at 606. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
,the court concluded that, although law enforcement officers had
articulable suspicion to believe that Reid was armed, the facts were
insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 305-06, 51 A.3d at 607.
According to the court, presence in a high crime area, unprovoked flight,
and the possibility of being armed do not reach the probable cause
standard. Id. at 307, 51 A.3d at 607 (citing Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341,
958 A.2d 356 (2008)).
Without sufficient probable cause, the court held that the public safety
exception to Miranda did not apply to Reid's statements. Reid, 428 Md.
at 309, 51 A.3d at 608. Although Miranda violations may be excused
when police questioning is directed at eliminating a threat to public
safety, it will not remove the taint of a previous Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. at 308-09, 51 A.3d at 608. Additionally, the court was
unwilling to engage in appellate fact-finding while the record below was
devoid of any evidence showing what would have happened, had Reid's
illegal arrest not occurred. !d. at 311-12, 51 A.3d at 610.
A strong dissent argued that the use of a taser in dart mode was
reasonable, and therefore the Terry stop was proper. Reid, 428 Md. at
313, 51 A.3d at 611 (Harrell, J., dissenting). In determining whether a de
facto arrest occurred, the dissent considered multiple factors to balance
the intrusion on the Fourth Amendment against governmental interest,
such as duration of the stop as well as the suspect's evasive actions. Id. at
314-15, 51 A.3d at 612 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Acknowledging the
growth in police technology and the interest in protecting the safety of
officers and civilians alike, the dissent asserted that the use of a taser in
dart mode was reasonable and thus fell into the realm of a proper Terry
stop. Id. at 330, 51 A.3d at 621 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
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As a result of this decision, the court has stunted law enforcement's
ability to utilize tasers in effectuating Terry stops. This places law
enforcement officers in dangerous situations where they may be forced to
engage physically with an armed individual. It further places other lessthan lethal force modalities, such as non-dart tasers, in a legal gray area,
leaving police departments to wonder if they are permitted to reap the
benefits of new technology.

